Our new approach enriches the general additive monopolistic competition model (AMCM)with a space of product characteristics: consumers' ideal varieties. Unlike Hotelling, such partially localized competition involves intersecting zones of service among (continuously distributed) producers. Then, the uniform equilibrium rms' density increases with growing population, as with the usual AMCM. However, now increasing/decreasing prices are determined by the increasing/decreasing elasticity of elementary utility (instead of demand elasticity in AMCM). A new characteristic the rm's range of service decreases. Such ner matching between buyers and sellers becomes a new source of welfare gain from a thicker market, unlike the variety benet in AMCM. The free-entry competition remains socially excessive under some natural preferences.
Introduction
Motivation. Some similar markets generate dierent, broad or narrow niches: e.g., half of the beer market in the US is covered by only three brands, whereas no brand has even ten percent of the beer market in the UK. Analogously, in a bigger city we typically observe more restaurants with narrow specialization: Italian, Japanese and other, which is not typical in small towns.
Why?
In markets for dierentiated products, one can observe that individuals typically vary in their ideal goods, e.g. favourite type of beer or coee yet choose something dierent from time to time. Thus, love for variety is struggling with love for ideal product type. The reason can lie in multi-dimensional characteristics; for instance, a lady would like her ideal size, but also explores various brands and fashions, possibly supplied only with other sizes. Then there will be a trade-o, which results in a non-equal mixture of ideal and non-ideal sizes (varieties) in the consumption bundle. Somewhat similarly, consumers in a city quite often buy food from the nearest shop but also use other shops from time to time. Such behaviour generates an overlap of the range of service of the shops. On a country-wide scale, we also observe overlapping trade areas of various rms, though closer clients are served more frequently. Summarizing, many real markets show partially-localized consumer preferences and thereby partially-localized competition.
Our goal is to build a proper model of such competition and understand the market-size effects and their importance for welfare. Looking from another angle, we question the robustness of the mainstream theory of monopolistic competition to consumers' heterogeneity (a dimension orthogonal to rm heterogeneity). As we shall see, some but not all standard theoretical conclusions for price eects, welfare distortions and market-size gains remain valid.
In essence, our new model lls the gap between two traditional polar views on competition: spatial competition and monopolistic competition. Namely, we combine the (free-entry version of ) Hotelling's (1929) consumer ideal points with Chamberlinian (1933) love for variety, in a simple but general way. Seeking for the simplest, most parsimonious combination, we maintain all elements of the monopolistic competition theory, but only replace the traditional representative consumer by spatially heterogenous consumers. Setting. Consumers are continuously and uniformly distributed along a circumference similar to the Salop (1979) model. This space can represent geographical locations or space of consumers' tastes, i.e., ideal points (addresses) among varieties of the dierentiated good. In contrast to inelastic demand in Salop, here each consumer combines various quantities of ideal and non-ideal varieties in her consumption bundle due to her love for variety. Consumers are identical in preferences with the same (unspecied additive) utility function and same income, but dier in their locations. Naturally, everyone prefers varieties (rms) located closer rather than farther away, so that the demand gradually fades with distance. Such behaviour is described by a linear cost of distance introduced in two versions: either as a disutility of distance from the ideal, or as a monetary cost for transporting (or adjusting) the good to the ideal.
The monetary version is better suited for the geographical interpretation of the model (or for production-components goods), whereas disutility of distance has more appeal for consumer goods and the space of their product characteristics. 4 Other space-and-variety models are discussed later on in the literature review.
Following Chamberlin (1933) and Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) , our market exhibits free entry and increasing returns in producing a dierentiated good so that the number (continuum) of rms is endogenously determined unlike Hotelling (1929) ). Homogeneous rms simultaneously choose their prices and their locations, taking as given the density of consumers and the current local intensity of competition. Gross demand of a rm is the sum of all consumers' demand schedules within its range of service, where the distance cost allows for positive demand. In the most general version of our approach, the market equilibrium should consist of three curves in the address space: (i) density of rms, (ii) their prices, (iii) competition intensity (marginal utility of money). However, this paper deals only with the basic model having a uniform density of consumers and uniform distribution of rms. Such an equilibrium boils down to three scalars : the mass of rms, price, and the intensity of competition. These three variables of the model converge to the pattern of the standard spaceless model of monopolistic competition presented in ZKPT, when the circular space of consumers shrinks to a point, or the distance cost shrinks to zero.
Under positive distance costs, the new model enables richer predictions than ZKPT in terms of the range of service and allows for two regimes. Under utilities which have a nite derivative at zero (choke-price) like constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), some suciently high distance costs generate partial coverage of consumers by service of every rm. By contrast, decreasing distance costs eventually turn this world rst into full-coverage regime, and then, at the limit, into the usual spaceless additive monopolistic competition.
Among results, the basic technical achievement is a convenient reformulation of a rm's aggregated demand in the form of a consumer surplus of the elementary utility function (taken at the consumption of the ideal variety). With this, our new uniform spatial model becomes almost as simple and tractable as the usual monopolistic competition. This technique enables us to expand some of theoretical results to the world of heterogenous consumers.
The market-size eects are adressed as in ZKPT. Should a thicker market make our rms more numerous and large, simultaneously pushing their prices down? Our answer is generally positive for both regimes: full or partial coverage of consumers by the rm's service.
More specically, under partial coverage, a growing population density generally leads to: (i) more rms entring the market; (ii) keener competition; (iii) less individual consumption of each variety; (iv) more localized competition (smaller range of service), however, (v) both the price behaviour and rm size depend on the elasticity of elementary utility. Namely, prices and mark-ups go down, rms increase in size under natural condition of decreasing elasticity of utility (DEU), whereas the opposite eects take place under the opposite condition.
This outcome is similar to ZKPT, where the necessary and sucient condition for the procompetitive eect of the market size on prices is an increasingly elastic demand (IED). The dierence can be better understood by analysing market size impacts in two stages. First, we aggregate the demand of heterogeneous consumers, second, to the aggregate demand we apply the main equation of ZKPT model the elasticity of revenue must equal the elasticity of cost.
As we have explained, the aggregate demand takes the form of a consumer surplus. Therefore, now IED is replaced by DEU condition. Although none of the two conditions, IED and DEU, implies the other, their intuitive interpretation is quite similar: the demand is not too convex, which is supposed realistic by those economists who support variable elasticity of substitution (Eckel and Neary, 2010) .
A decrease in distance-costs aects equilibria in the same way as the increasing population density. The intensity of competition and the density of rms increase, and prices also react analogously to the market expansion. Another eect, specic to the decreasing distance-cost parameter, is an (eventually) increasing range of service. We show that the usual monopolistic competition of ZKPT is really a limiting case of the spatial competition when the distance cost fades away.
Intuitively, the absolute market size (length of the circumference) impacts the market quite dierently from the relative market size (population density). Namely, under partial coverage of consumers by service, the length does not matter for equilibrium prices and rm sizes. Indeed, imagine a globe where each location (type of agent) trades only with its close neighbours. Then, the size of the globe is immaterial. However, this independence ceases to hold when the distance cost decreases to the level when each rm services the whole globe. Under full coverage, the world size works similar to the distance cost. Both regimes can have their implications in economic geography, where this model could be an appropriate continuous substitute of similar network models (see Ushchev and Zenou, 2015) .
Welfare is analysed by decomposing consumer gains into two components. The rst part represents welfare as if all the consumed varieties were ideal, while the second part accounts for losses from the consumption of non-ideal varieties. We show that in a thicker market these losses are smaller, i.e., a supply of varieties is better matched to heterogeneous consumers'
tastes. This highlights a new source of gains from market expansion. This better match to heterogeneous consumers' tastes was always the heart of the verbal explanation of love for variety in monopolistic competition. Finally, our model makes this argument explicit, instead of leaving it obscure or hidden in the utility of the representative consumer.
In a thicker market, a consumer spends her budget for varieties closer to her ideal, which become cheaper at the same time (under the natural DEU assumption). This double benet yields a positive eect on welfare. At the same time, a variety per se (consumed by a person) expands less than the mass of rms due to the shrinking range of service. In other words, the mass (density) of rms in the market is incompletely translated here into the variety consumed, unlike spaceless models. Through these lenses, the price index, usual for trade literature, can be just a misleading measure of welfare gains from a thicker market or trade, a concept nonobviously related to welfare. Indeed, consuming more food (varieties) which one does not like is not a welfare gain, compared to less but preferred variety.
Distortion. Further, the question since Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) is variety distortion. Does free entry let too many or too few rms into the market, from a social viewpoint? The usual trade-o here means that less variety could save entry costs and thereby bring cheaper goods from bigger rms. Dixit and Stiglitz establish a welfare criterion for a spaceless market: any DEU preference creates excessive competition, while IEU yields insucient competition, CES being the borderline case with no distortion. In our model, under partial coverage, we nd some necessary and sucient condition on the elementary utility which guarantees excessive entry; CES is not borderline here because it does not allow for partial coverage.
Demand aggregation. Although our results in general corroborate the monopolistic competition theory, a theorist should be more interested in a dierence of spatial monopolistic competition from the usual spaceless one. The rst observation is that under partial coverage by service, the range of service becomes a new and important market characteristic. A more fundamental question is: how does heterogeneity modify the shape of the gross demand function?
As Osharin et al. (2014) show, heterogeneity combined with aggregation can make the demand function more convex. For instance, a quadratic elementary utility u(q) = q − q 2 /2 (dependent on individual consumption q) generates a linear individual demand function q = 1 − (p + t), which depends upon price p and the cost-of-distance coecient t. In our model the rm's gross demand Q appears quadratic in price: Q = (1 − p) 2 /2t, whihc is quite dierent from individual demand, more convex.
5 Similarly, a spatial aggregate of CES individual demands, generates a CES demand with a dierent, higher degree of convexity, which is situation-specic, dependent upon equilibrium variables. These simple examples show why our spatial model diers in some theoretical predictions from the usual one. They explain also a spatial version of demand aggregation: in spite of very similar consumers, a permanent representative consumer is a false concept. Instead, a situation-specic aggregate of consumers is relevant, dependent on distance costs and the intensity of competition. Through this example, we express a word of caution about the interpretation of empirical results. Demand characteristics, elasticity of substitution, and estimated gains from trade, inferred from individual level data can (and should, because our model) substantially dier from those estimated from market level data within studies like Arkolakis et al. (2015) . Therefore, addressing consumer heterogeneity is necessary to reconcile such dierences and reinterpret the market eects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related literature.
Section 3 presents the core model, and Section 4 establishes the market eects and formalizes our welfare argument. The conclusion summarizes and Appendix contains proofs and the analysis of the version of the model with utility cost of distance.
Literature review
Literature. There are many papers on new trade theory with monopolistic competition, but with discrete locations (countries or cities), and often with too specic preferences. This discrete technique and focus on specic functions both shadow the links between general preference properties (concavity, elasticity) and market eects; instead, a continuous space enables algebraic tools of integration which reveal sucient (or even necessary and sucient) conditions on the demand structure for important market eects.
Several early attempts to combine continuous space and free entry were pioneered by Lancaster's (1966, 1975) approach to product characteristics. The spokes model by Chen and Riordan (2007) also pursues the same goals as ours, but exploits an exotic space: exogenously expanding dimensions of product characteristics and trade through the hub.This may help to model the fashion industry, but it is dicult to reconcile with our focus on a xed geographical space or a space of characteristics like colour or design. Among other models serving us a benchmark, Picard and Tabuchi (2010) was the starting point for a continuous distribution of rms on the circumference. They found that stable equilibria are given by discrete distributions of rms and workers rather than continuous distributions.
6
Closer to bringing together the love for variety and address models of product dierentiation, are several papers on multi-product rms in trade. They highlight the same better 5 By the way, our preliminary inquiry suggests that in some cases, heterogeneity and related excessive demand convexity may destroy the usual assumption of concave prot. In this case, multiple local maxima arise, but we leave aside this complex problem. 6 Among other continuous models of economic geography, Allen and Arkolakis (2014) propose a continuous model of economic geography based on CES gravity equations in generating trade ows under given topography (pairwise location-specic trade frictions). Mobile consumers-workers generate local outputs and equalize welfare across locations populated. Unlike ours, the focus is on predicting a stable economic geography under given topography in continuous way, extending thereby the network-style discrete geography modeling. The latter is summarized in Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2014), where heterogeneous agents choose cities conditional on their talent. Unlike this important exible manufacturing and core competency literature that have direct empirical justication, we put distance costs on the consumer side, avoid multi-product rms and cannibalization motives, and focus on a closed economy. Otherwise our range of service looks isomorphic to the rm scope, and our distance is the same as their distance from their core competency. More essentially, unlike all of these studies, we exploit unspecied additive preferences and continuous number of versions per rm, to nd the simplest general conditions on the demand curvature that provide price-decreasing competition with tighter rm specialization.
Spatial model with uniform equilibria
In this section we set up a simplied version of our model. We assume that consumers are distributed uniformly over the circumference of arbitrary length. A point on the circumference can be viewed as a geographic location or a specic product in the product characteristic space.
Firms are free to choose any point on the circumference to enter. For now we constrain our attention to the case where rms are also distributed uniformly over the circumference. In what follows, we label it a uniform equilibrium. The concept of uniform equilibria may be criticized because they need not be stable and because non-uniform consumer distribution is unlikely to give rise to a uniform distribution of rms. However, without this basic model more complicated equilibria are dicult to comprehend. To support an approximately-uniform, or at least continuous distribution of rms, we introduce, in a reduced form, an external dispersion force that pushes one rm away from another. It represents the price of land and other congestion forces common to economic geography but not modelled here explicitly. In this case the tendency towards dispersion of rms looks more plausible.
In what follows we consider a version of a spatial model with a monetary transport cost.
The adjustment cost for consuming products produced further away from a consumer's location enters the budget constraint. This formulation is common in economic geography, and it is also ts well to the case when our consumer is actually a rm that consumes some intermediate good, incurring cost for adjusting the good to t its exact needs. We also consider a version of the model where the transport cost directly enters the utility function. This variation has more appeal for the consumption goods, because here distance from one's favourite variety has some disutility value. Since the results appear to be very similar, we relegate the discussion of the disutility of distance version of the model to the appendix.
General model setup
Consumers and varieties. The consumers are identical except for their addresses. As in Hotelling (1929) , any consumer type is characterized by her bliss point x in some commodity space Ω, i.e., her favourite variety of the dierentiated good. The types are uniformly distributed with density L along the circular space of product characteristics, the circumference Ω = [−S, S] of length 2S, where 0 is any given point (such Salop's race-track economy is a proxy for a long linear interval). Each consumer supplies one unit of a numeraire good (for instance, labour) to the market, in exchange for all varieties she consumes. Following the Chamberlinian tradition, each variety is produced by a single rm and each rm produces a single product.
There is a continuum of rms and a rm's type denoted y ∈ [−S, S] refers to its location on the circumference. The rm's address means its targeted type of consumers, whereas (endogenous) density µ y is the measure of such rms in the same location. In this section the density µ y ≡ µ > 0 is a scalar, assumed to be the same at each location y ∈ Ω. In addition, we assume mill pricing by the rms, i.e., a rm at y charges a f.o.b. price p y for its product.
Because of symmetry, after rms optimize their prices, the price distribution will become also uniform with p y ≡ p > 0.
Importantly, ranges of the service of various rms do intersect with each other, because consumers love variety. However, they love dierent varieties unequally. The bliss-point variety is slightly preferred to other varieties. For instance, one can imagine a consumer occasionally using many restaurants in her city but preferring the closest ones. In the monetary version of distance, we suppose that either adjusting the non-ideal variety to consumer's tastes is costly, or carrying a purchase home from a remote shop is costly. Specically, we assume adjustment costs q · τ (θ) for buying q and carrying it home from distance θ, where τ (·) is an increasing function of distance, assumed to be linear for exposition simplicity.
Hence, in both versions the remote varieties will be consumed in smaller amounts than close varieties. In particular, extremely remote varieties may not be consumed. In equilibrium each consumer x has an (endogenous) rangeθ of varieties (rm types) that she wishes to buy, whereθ ∈ (0, S] denotes the distance to go shopping, or the range of service, uniform among consumers. An equilibrium may result in a small rangeθ < S which means partial coverage of the circumference Ω by each rm's service. Another possibility is full coverage by serviceθ = S, occurring when the cost of distance is small enough to buy products (in dierent quantities) from all rms. Now we can formulate the consumer's optimization problem. Given the (uniform) price distribution p and the rm distribution µ, the consumer seeks to maximize her utility subject to the budget constraint:
Here a consumer located at x, who buys quantity q xy from a rm located at y, enjoys the direct utility u(q xy ) and bears some losses q xy τ (x, y). The elementary utility function u(·) is assumed to be increasing, thrice dierentiable and concave, thus generating love for variety. If a consumer does not consume a variety, her utility from it is u(0) = 0, i.e., the existence of a variety per se does not generate any benets. For some results we shall need also a choke-price assumption u (0) < ∞.
One can see that our total utility is additive in its elementary utilities over the whole range of varieties. Such unspecied elementary utility function u(·) will allow us to relate arising market eects to the features of preferences as in ZKPT, and to contrast the results with non-spatial monopolistic competition.
The transport cost function τ (x, y) depends on the distance between x and y and represents the monetary cost per unit of consumption. The distant varieties are worse than the ideal variety, by assumption τ (x, x) = 0, τ (x, y) > 0 (x = y). Though our model allows for more general forms, for simplicity here we assume the transport cost to be linear in distance. Given that our space is a unit circumference, linearity implies the shortest (right or left) distance in the form:
The transport cost can describe situations where space is geographical and a consumer spends her money to bring varieties home, or when some costly adjustment is needed, like adjusting the size of clothing.
Using the Lagrange multiplier λ, the utility maximization yields the demand of consumer x for variety-type y expressed as:
is the demand that equals the inverse derivative of the elementary utility when positive, otherwise zero. Naturally, here the Lagrange multiplier λ = λ(µ, p) is not the argument but the result of the consumer's optimization under a given vector (µ, p) of all prices and densities on Ω, which is the true argument of her demand function.
Producers. As we have seen, the solution to the consumer problem gives rise to the location-specic individual demand functions d xy :
It shows how much a consumer at x buys from a rm located at y, under given prices p and market situation µ, λ(µ, p). Each producer takes the demand functions and the level of competition λ as given when choosing her price to maximize its prot. Following the monopolistic competition literature, we assume a constant marginal cost m of production and a xed cost F to operate in the market. In addition, for some special results we introduce a reduced form of the dispersion force into the model through the location-specic xed cost F y = F (µ y ), which is a non-decreasing function of the density of rms at location y. However, in the main part of our paper we treat the cost F as constant, assuming that its dependence on the density is weak enough to be neglected in our comparative statics analysis.
7 7 Nevertheless, we introduce a dispersion force for two reasons. First, the dispersion forces are especially important conceptually in the interpretation relevant to economic geography. Indeed, concentration of rms in a particular location raises the price of land and increases the congestion costs. Second, theoretically, the presence of a dispersion force can eliminate potential instability of continuous uniform equilibria that we study. The latter consideration can be relevant, since preliminary computer simulations reveal that continuous equilibria need not be always stable (stability means that any small deviation of an equilibrium curve will return to the original curve). Formally, a producer y chooses her price p y to maximize her prot Π y (·) as:
Equilibrium. Entry into any location is free, so that prots must vanish at each location:
Symmetric equilibrium is a bundle p, λ, µ, {q xy } (x,y)∈Ω 2 of price, competition level, density of rms and location-specic consumption quantities which solve all consumer and producer optimization programs, and satisfy the free-entry condition (2).
8 The labour balance in the economy follows from the budget constraint.
This general denition of equilibrium is valid for both versions of the model and both cases:
full or partial coverage of the market by a rm. In the following analysis of each version, we shall specify the equilibrium denition in more detail, to simplify exposition in each case.
[ Figure 1 is about here.] 
Equilibrium analysis
Full or partial coverage by service. From the complementary slackness condition of optimization, it can be seen that if the derivative u (0) is small enough relative to the distance cost t, then q xy = 0 for all rms y located suciently far from x (zero demand). In the opposite case, it might be that q xy > 0 for every pair x and y on space Ω (for instance, it must be the case when derivative u (0) = ∞). We shall call the former case partial coverage because a rm does not serve every consumer, and distinguish it full coverage ; these are the two possible regimes of the model. As we show later, this distinction is quite important because the comparative statics of these two kinds of equilibria diers. To comprise both cases, the lengthθ of coverage (radius of service) can be found as:
Equilibria with partial coverage
We start our analysis with the case of partial coverage of the market by a rm. Because we consider only uniform equilibria (rms are identical up to rotation), it is sucient to focus on a rm located at y = 0 and on its price p ≡ p| y=0 . Recall that the elementary demand function is D(P ) = u −1 (P ) ∨ 0 whenever the positive inverse of the marginal utility exists, otherwise demand is zero (here P ≡ p + τ (x, y)). With this notation, the gross consumption per consumer Q and the rm's prot can be written as:
We should emphasize that when maximizing prot, producers take the intensity of competition λ as given. Here variable θ ≡ |x − y| denotes the consumer-producer distance, i.e., the shortest way from any consumer-type θ ∈ [0,θ] to a rm located at 0. Aggregate output LQ sold by the rm is the sum of quantities sold to all consumers between the limiting points −θ(p) andθ(p). Density L of consumers at each location factorizes the total output of the rm sold to all consumers served (LS is the total population).
Integral Q of the (inverse) derivative of u can be easily simplied for the case of linear cost function τ (θ, 0) = tθ. Namely, we consider D (whose argument runs from the minimal price λp to the maximal price λp + λtθ), and argue that integrating D is the same as integrating its inverse u whose argument runs from 0 to maximum value q 0 = D(λp), which is the maximal purchase occurring near the consumer's bliss-point. Essentially, instead of integrating consumer demand over the locations, we integrate it now over the quantity range. Technically, it amounts to substitution of variables: q = D(λp + λtθ), or changing the axis of integration in the pricequantity space (the demand triangle). Then, any rm's gross output LQ can be represented
This magnitude LQ is similar to the consumer surplus in spaceless IO models and decreases in p and λ. In fact, it is the surplus of the consumer located exactly at the rm's location x = y. Of course, this simplied aggregate demand structure relies on the assumption of linear transport cost τ (θ) = tθ. Consequently, under uniform equilibrium with partial coverage of consumers, any producer's prot can be rewritten without an integral, and the free-entry condition becomes as simple as
Dierentiating such prot (4) w.r.t. price p, we arrive at the rm's rst-order condition (FOC):
Furthermore, dierentiating the FOC expression (5) we get the producer's second-order condition for prot maximization:
This strict inequality is assumed to hold in the neighborhood of equilibrium. It is guaranteed, whenever the elasticity of marginal utility is larger than 1/2. Thus, the producer's optimality condition Π p (p, λ) = 0 together with the free-entry condition Π(p, λ) = 0 determine the equilibrium pair of price and competition intensity (p, λ). Using them, other equilibrium magnitudes of interest can be obtained via the consumer's rst-order condition and the budget constraint: consumption, density of rms and range of service.
For further analysis, now we rewrite the rm's rst-order and free-entry conditions in (p, q 0 ) variables, where q 0 = D(λp) is the consumption of the ideal variety, instead of (p, λ), using the fact that λ = u (q 0 ) p . Then the rm's rst-order and free-entry conditions can be conveniently reformulated as the link between markup p m and the elasticity of utility ε u (q 0 ) ≡
, involving also the xed cost F :
Expressing price p = m + tF (µ) 2Lq 0 , these two can be reduced to a single equation w.r.t. quantity q 0 consumed near the rm:
or an equation w.r.t. price:
Observe that positivity in equation (7) imposes condition ε u (q 0 ) > 1/2 on the elasticity (otherwise no equilibrium exists), and that when cost F (µ) = F =const., either of the two equations (7) and (8) is sucient to nd an equilibrium, otherwise both must be solved jointly with the consumer's budget constraint. Under a reasonable assumption that elasticity ε u ∈ (1/2, 1) decreases from ε u (0) = 1, the right-hand side of (8) increases in p from a negative value to larger than 1, and therefore a unique equilibrium exists (under more general, increasing ε u , we did not nd any counterexample).
Also we note that under xed cost F , a single exogenous relative market size parameter: L ≡ 2m 2 L tF (9) characterizes some market eects, notably, it governs all changes in the equilibrium consumption and mark-up. Now we summarize this equilibrium characterization. Lemma 1. Under linear distance cost τ (θ) = tθ and uniform equilibrium with partial coverage of consumers, any producer's prot takes the simple form (4), whereas the equilibrium price, quantity and intensity of competition are determined by (6) , (7) and (8) . Relative market sizê L (9), also reecting three kinds of costs, is the main exogenous parameter, whereas absolute size S of space does not aect equilibrium.
In other words, for equilibrium analysis, any impact of changes in cost composition F/m 2 , transport cost t, and/or population L, altogether can be studied in the same fashion through varying parameterL. The independence of equilibria from the absolute size S of the market is in sharp contrast with a spaceless economy, or the full coverage economy (a hybrid between the partial coverage and the spaceless economy). Ina geographical interpretation, such independence looks reasonable: whenever a rm trades only within some limited area, the competition on the other side of the globe becomes immaterial to it, as does the globe size, only the population density in the neighbourhood matters.
Comparative statics. We have characterized the equilibrium in the case of partial coverage by service. Now we study it regarding our question of interest: how does the equilibrium react to changes in the relative market sizeL? In particular, should increasing market size or decreasing transport cost lead to lower prices through the intensied competition? The answer depends on the properties of utility function, as we nd now.
In what follows, we extensively use the consumer's demand q 0 = D(λp) (denoting the utilitymaximizing consumption of her ideal variety) and the elasticity ε u (q) =
of the elementary utility.
Proof. Since L/tF enters the equilibrium conditions jointly, any impact of the transport cost or xed cost on price/quantity follows immediately from the results below regarding the population density L, which we focus on here.
From the rst equilibrium condition in (6), we have 1/2 < ε u (q 0 ) < 1. Totally dierentiating both conditions w.r.t. L, we obtain:
dq 0 dL = m p 2 dp dL and 2Lq 0 dp dL
It follows from the rst equation that price p and ideal quantity q 0 comove for DEU and move in the opposite direction for IEU. Combining the equations we get:
Using the fact that ε u (q 0 ) =
we can rewrite the expression in the square brackets as
The rm's second-order condition can be expressed as
+ 2q 0 > 0, which is exactly the bracketed term. Thus, the bracketed term in (10) is positive, and hence dq 0 dL < 0, implying that consumption of the ideal variety always decreases with the population density. The result for the increasing/decreasing price behaviour under IEU/DEU follows from decreasing q 0 and equations (6) . A rm's output LQ always changes opposite to price because of the free-entry condition (p − m)LQ = F . Using Π(p, λ) = 0 together with Π p = 0 and manipulating, we have
This means that the intensity of competition λ increases with the population density regardless of the nature of preferences. In addition, we get
Thus, the intensity of competition increases when distance costs decrease. However, it does not increase too fast because ε λ t < 1/2 implies that both λt and λ 2 t decrease when the distance cost decreases.
Now, we focus onθ. As q 0 decreases, λp = u (q 0 ) increases and λ increases too. Therefore, the radius of serviceθ =
2 )
The latter integrand does not depend on any equilibrium variable, whereas the upper limit of integration q 0 = D(λp) decreases with market size, as we have proven. Therefore, the entire integral decreases. In addition, the intensity of competition λ increases, and thus, the increasing population density leads to additional entry, which means an increase in the density of rms µ. Consequently, under DEU, each consumer's welfare U = µ´Ω u(q xy )dy increases because of more varieties and cheaper goods.
Q.E.D.
These comparative statics results generally look intuitive. Higher consumer density should attract more rms to each location. This shift intensies local competition and pushes the consumption of each individual variety down because more varieties are readily available to consumers. As a consequence, one would expect decreasing prices. Indeed, this is really the case under the natural DEU assumption. Essentially, we have classied all markets according to the elasticity ε u into two categories: DEU-markets react pro-competitively to the relative market size (a drop in prices under higher competition), while those with IEU behave anti-competitively.
It looks plausible, that the DEU case is more realistic, at least, it is widespread in theory. For instance, the widely used linear demand, CARA and HARA (hyperbolic-absolute risk aversion) utility functions, all generate DEU.
10 Notably, these three kinds of preferences generate similar pro-competitive eects in the usual spaceless monopolistic competition models as well, but for a dierent reason: not because of DEU, but because of IED, see ZKPT. In principle, a combination of the properties IED+DEU is common among preferences and considered natural but not guaranteed.
Why in spatial competition does increasing or decreasing elasticity of utility govern prices unlike increasing or decreasing demand elasticity in ZKPT? The dierence stems from the 10 CES utility is neutral in this respect, but irrelevant for this subsection, being incompatible with partial coverage of consumers.
fact that now gross demand is the aggregate of the local demands u The impact of decreasing costs t on the radiusθ is more involved. Cheaper transport leads to an expansion of the radius directly, whereas equilibrium forces, as in the case of increasing population density, push the radius of service down indirectly. The sign of the net eect of these two eects is unclear. Analogously, the eect on the density of rms µ when the distance cost t decreases, is ambiguous.
Equilibria with complete coverage
When transport costs decrease, each rm eventually covers the entire market. However, unlike the ZKPT spaceless model, quantities are decreasing in distance to consumers. This case is dicult analytically because there are two dierent market operating modes. Intuitively, as the transport cost gets suciently small, the model converges to the spaceless one, and the comparative statics is governed by the elasticity of individual demand (marginal utility), as in the ZKPT model. On the other hand, when the space is weakly covered, i.e. consumption of the most remote varieties is very small, it behaves similar to the model with partial coverage, where comparative statics is governed mostly by the elasticity of elementary utility. Therefore, in this subsection the comparative statics should be between partial coverage and spaceless regimes, so that it depends on both the elasticity of utility and the elasticity of marginal utility. Because of this diculty, here we provide incomplete characterization of the full-coverage regime, focusing only on the popular and arguably natural case of not too-convex demands:
IED+DEU preferences (including CARA, HARA and quadratic utility, explained in the section Pro-competitive preferences after Proposition 2). We assume also naturally bounded demand
To study full coverage, in addition to the consumption quantity of an ideal variety q 0 = D(λp), we introduce a notation for the quantity of the least preferred variety q 1 ≡ D(λp + λtS) on the circumference Ω. This (after changing the variables of integration in a similar fashion as before) allows us to express a rm's gross demand LQ as the dierence between two consumer surpluses at q 0 and at q 1 :
In other words, the rm's total demand is proportional to the dierence in consumer surpluses between its closest and its farthest consumers, where Q is the individual gross consumption per unit of rm density µ. Again, this relatively straightforward representation relies on the linear distance cost (this restrictive assumption is not uncommon in the literature). As in the case of partial coverage, the free-entry condition and the rms' prot maximizing behaviour (FOC) become the equilibrium conditions in (p, λ) variables:
Under constant cost F (µ) = F (which we assume further), (p, λ) variables can be determined by these two conditions. Similar to the case studied before, consumption of varieties q 0 and q 1 and density of rms µ can be derived from (p, λ) using a consumer's optimality condition and the budget constraint.
Using q 0 ≡ D(λp) and q 1 ≡ D(λp + λtS), all our equilibrium conditions can be transformed into four equations w.r.t. (λ, p, q 0 , q 1 ):
that can be reduced to two explicit equations in q 0 and q 1 , constructed from an arbitrary utility function u(·). It can be seen that (unlike the previous case) the size of the world S matters now, though the relative market size parameter L/F again plays an important role in comparative statics. Another comparative statics with distance cost t enables us to compare the partial coverage model with the spaceless model, which will be discussed after Proposition 2.
Now we conduct comparative statics with a certain restriction on the demand convexity or atness at the equilibrium point:
The analytical complexity of this kind of equilibria precludes a complete characterization of the comparative statics. Nevertheless, we show now that the market behaves pro-competitively when individual demand is relatively at.
Proposition 3. Consider a model with constant F and complete market coverage. An increase in the relative local market size L/F leads to an increase in the intensity of competition λ.
It also leads to a decreasing price p (a pro-competitive reaction) if and only if condition (16) holds, which is guaranteed, when the ratio −u (q)/u (q) is an increasing function. Moreover, each rm's output LQ changes oppositely to price under growing L/t.
Proof. We may focus on the market reaction to L, since reaction to L/F is analogous (as one can see from equations (14), dependent on L/F fraction, rather than L and F separately). First, we study λ by totally dierentiating the free-entry condition (13), exploiting itself and FOC Π p = 0 in equilibrium. After some algebra, we can sign as follows:
> 0, 11 Another way to know the sign of the total derivative λ L > 0 is to express dΠ/dL
and further exploit the negative partial derivative Q λ < 0.
where the inequality follows from the free-entry condition in the form (14) :
= 1 into E λ we can express the total elasticity as
Then, substituting the same expression, we get
Second, totally dierentiating FOC Π p = 0, we express the cross-derivatives as: Π pp dp dL
Since Π pp < 0 in equilibrium (because of the SOC) and dλ dL > 0 as established, the sign of the comparative statics of the price with respect to the market size coincides with the sign of the cross derivative Π pλ of the prot function. The last step is to characterize this sign:
We now rewrite this in terms of variables q 0 = D(λp) = u −1 (λp) and q 1 = D(λp + λt/2)
:
where we have used FOC in terms of q 1 and q 0 . Now replacing λ = u (q 0 )/p and simplifying, we come to (16) as a necessary and sucient condition for Π pλ < 0, and hence dp dL < 0. Furthermore, our assumption of increasing function −u (q)/u (q) yields also a weaker inequality (16), as we Pro-competitive preferences Under condition (16) , the comparative statics is pro-competitive, i.e. prices decrease with the increasing local market size, because of increasing competition.
What does this condition mean? As we have said, it corresponds to a low (in some sense) convexity of demand. In particular, linear demand D = a − bq (which is very at) satises (16) because the right-hand side becomes negative, whereas the left-hand side is always positive. Similarly, the CARA utility given by u(q) = 1 − e −αq , also satises (16) because it has constant characteristic −u (q)/u (q) and the right-hand side of (16) is zero. As for the more convex demand, generated by HARA utility u(q) = (a + q) ρ (ρ < 1, a ≥ 0), it has a decreasing characteristic −u (q)/u (q) (as well as its particular case CES), nevertheless, after some tedious algebra one can show that condition (16) hold whenever a > 0.
The positive right-hand side need not dominate over the positive left-hand side in (16) . In particular, calculations show that under CES the condition (16) 
, which is not obviously satised. Unlike spaceless models, we could expect from CES a price-changing eect of a bigger market in a spatial model (CES must generate full coverage). However, plugging the CES utility into the full-coverage equilibrium conditions (14)- (15), we can reduce them to Convergence to a spaceless model. We would argue that full coverage is an intermediate regime between partial coverage and a spaceless economy. Indeed, one can see from (13) that when the distance cost t vanishes, the dierence q 0 − q 1 vanishes too. This explains the convergence of the full-coverage equilibrium to the usual spaceless equilibrium explored in ZKPT.
This convergence is more evident from equation (11) which becomes Q(p, λ) = 2LS · D(λp) under t = 0, where 2LS denotes the total population in the economy, whereas L denotes the population density. Under such an expression of output Q, both prot maximization and freeentry conditions take their usual spaceless form, as in ZKPT. Looking at a similar convergence in the opposite direction (t → ∞), one can see that the full-coverage equilibrium equations in the form (11)- (12)- (13) degenerate into partial-coverage equations (3)- (4)- (5) at some stage of growing t, namely, when cost t is big enough to annihilate (the farthest from home) consumption q 1 → 0.
[ Figure 2 is about here.]
Similarly important for robust modelling is the below lemma. Under full coverage, it states that our necessary and sucient condition (16) 
Eects on welfare
As we argued above, our model highlights the new gains from market expansion. In addition to more available varieties and (potentially) cheaper products, consumers benet from the greater availability of the varieties they prefer more, i.e., from a better match between produced and consumed varieties. This argument has important implications for the welfare of trade liberalization since this channel of gains from trade is largely unexplored in the literature. In this subsection, we use the model to formalize this argument.
To clarify intuition, we start with a particular example. Suppose individual preferences are linear-quadratic, thus, the elementary utility function has the form u(q) = q − γ 2 q 2 . Denote the number of varieties consumed by a particular consumer by M and the total consumption volume by Q =´q i di. Then, simple algebra shows that consumers utility is equal to:
This aggregate utility decomposition is the rst step towards establishing our argument. 
γq 0
Now, we express the variance in consumption volumes as a function of equilibrium variables. γq 0 .
To show that this expression is decreasing with the market size we need to show that
We use the results, established in the Proposition 1:
After some tedious algebra we arrive at the following equivalent condition:
It is straightforward to verify that the left-hand side of this expression is increasing in γq 0 and the condition holds true for γq 0 = 1. Since in equilibrium the marginal utility must be positive, γq 0 cannot exceed 1, and hence, the condition holds. Therefore consumers gain from better matches with the varieties consumed, not only from total consumption Q. Q.E.D.
Conclusions
This theoretical paper makes an attempt to bridge two traditions in modelling markets with horizontal product dierentiation. Combining the Hotelling's (1929) address economy with Chamberlinian Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition, we develop a model that features both spatial and price competition under variable elasticity of substitution among varieties of a dierentiated product. The preference structure employed allows our consumers to have an ideal product and love for variety at the same time, consuming a range of varieties but in dierent quantities. This novelty intends to reect real life, where consumers stick to their favourite types of product most of the time, but occasionally deviate from them. The model attempts to better formalize the idea, that love for variety observed in the aggregate demand stems not only from personal preference for variety, but also from heterogeneity of preferences, and therefore might appear stronger (or weaker) in the aggregate than on the individual level.
Despite its complexity, this approach turns out tractable in a number of important respects and cases. In particular, a uniform equilibrium displays clear analytical results when the product space is a circumference with symmetric (uniformly distributed) consumers, bearing linear distance costs, either in monetary or in utility terms. We show that in both these versions of our model, the market behaves pro-competitively under reasonable assumptions: prices (and markups) decrease in response to increasing relative local market size (population density).
This implies the entry of additional rms whenever demand is not too convex, which includes many natural additive preference specications: CARA, HARA, etc. Specically, under partial coverage of the market by service (when not every consumer buys from each rm), the necessary and sucient condition for such a pro-competitive eect is the decreasing elasticity of the elementary utility instead of the decreasing elasticity of its derivative, known in spaceless monopolistic competition. Another eect (unknown in spaceless competition) is the shrinking range of service : a thicker market and more intense competition makes each rm more targeted to their core competence, i.e., to a specic consumer taste. What follows from these ndings for theory is, rst, a more rigorous notion of partially localized market competition. Yes, each rm directly competes mainly with few neighbours of her core competency, but indirectly each rm competes with all other rms. Moreover, its high (low) markup has nothing to do with the large (small) mass of its direct competitors, or strategic behavior, unlike the common view in IO. The mass of direct (local) competitors may decrease through the decreasing range of service simultaneously with decreasing mark-up, and for reasonable demand shapes it is indeed the case. Second, when developed towards economic geography, this model should generate a continuous version of the market potential concept (at each point of space), like network models arising now. This may entail new continuous models of agglomeration. Third, some estimates of preferences and gains from a bigger market may be revised through heterogeneity, as we explained in the Introduction.
We believe that our framework will pave the way for the future research. If various extensions of our model turn out to be tractable, then the implications of this new modelling strategy could modify many topics of IO, trade, and economic geography. The reason for this hope is realism: this strategy enables us to treat competition as partially localized, and a rm's demand as an aggregate demand of heterogeneous consumers. These two features make a lot of dierence for many economic questions, that may be revised now through continuous-spatial lenses. Maybe, after almost a century of numerous parallel developments in Hotelling's and Chamberlinian frameworks, and several fresh attempts to combine them, these two competing concepts of competition can be bridged in a more simple fashion.
Among the extensions left outside the scope of this paper, there is a need for multidimensional space, possibly with edges, for continuous models of economic geography, and for comparisons with data.
However, the most urgent extension is a possibility of non-uniform distribution of rms, even in the same homogenous circular economy. Can clusters or other spatial distributions of rms arise? It could be the case that free entry of rms leads to their grouping, or the standardization of products in the characteristic spaceminimal dierentiation principle, as was believed by Hotelling. In economic geography, such an outcome would mean spatial agglomeration of rms, like shopping malls or cities, stemming from competition per se, without any additional agglomeration force! More formally, this is the question of the multiplicity of equilibria and the stability of the uniform equilibrium. Our preliminary inquiry shows that under very at demands and monetary cost of distance, the uniform equilibrium can be unstable. Then, standardization (clusters of rms on the circumference) may occur as a typical stable equilibrium outcome.
However, cumbersome clarication of this important issue is left for future work. Here, as before,θ ∈ (0, S] is the range of consumption, withθ = S representing the case of full coverage, when a person consumes all varieties present. For a symmetric model, it makes no dierence, to study location x ≡ 0 or any other, so, we focus on the distance between consumer 0 and producer θ. We denote, as before, the demand function D(·) ≡ u −1 (·) ∨ 0 (that equals the derivative whenever positive). Solving FOC, we obtain the demand for a variety (rm) θ
given by
Here λ is again the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, i.e. the marginal utility of income and, at the same time, the intensity of competition. One can observe the basic dierence between the two setups: since costs of the mismatch between consumers and producers are now non-monetary, they are not multiplied by the marginal utility of money λ in the demand function. In other words, there is no need for the auxiliary translation of monetary costs into utility units.
Producers. As before, there is a continuum of producers, and each producer takes the intensity of competition λ and the demand schedule as given when maximizing her prot in price:
This producer's problem is similar to the previous, monetary-distance cost problem, only λtθ has turned into tθ. We again simplify the objective function using the change of the integration axes: instead of integrating over locations, we integrate consumption over quantities. This reformulation enables relatively simple aggregate demand representation. Thus, in the case of partial coverageθ < S, any rm's free-entry condition can be rewritten as
which in terms of q 0 becomes:
Analogously, for the case of full coverage (θ = S), prot takes the form:
Equilibrium. As previously, we allow the rms to relocate in space and enter/exit the market. Thereby, in equilibrium prots must vanish at each location: Π(p, λ) = 0, see (19) . This free-entry condition alongside with the rm's FOC optimality conditions dene an equilibrium in (p, λ) variables. All other equilibrium variables (q, µ,θ) can be derived from (p, λ) through the consumer's optimality condition and the budget constraint.
Symmetric equilibrium is a bundle (p, µ, λ, q,θ) including price, mass of rms, marginal utility of income, consumption quantities, and the radius of service, that satises consumers'
and producers' optimization conditions (including the budget constraint), and the free-entry condition.
Partial-coverage equilibria under disutility of distance
We start with the case of only partial coverage:θ < S. As in the monetary cost version of the model, we require the rm's second-order condition to hold in equilibrium:
First, observe that the rst-and second-order conditions (22) for prot maximization essentially do not dier from ones in the previous version of the model and the output is Q = 2L t
[u(D(λp)) − λpD(λp)]. Indeed, the only novelty in a rm's objective function is absent multiplier λ in expression λtθ. However, λ is treated parametrically by the producer, so, the logic remains the same. This observation (using previous analysis) allows for a straightforward characterization of equilibrium in variables (p, λ):
or (using q 0 = D(λp)) characterization in variables (p, q 0 ):
, these equations can be reduced to a single equation
The latter, in the case of DEU , demonstrates an increasing left-hand side expression (conveniently for comparative statics).
The dierence of new equilibrium equations from previous 2 −
) stems from the the absence of multiplier λ in one term of the free-entry condition. This relatively simple characterization of the equilibrium allows us to study the comparative statics with respect to the market size and the disutility cost.
Proposition 6. Consider the model with disutility of distance, partial market coverage and xed F (µ) = F . Then an increase in the relative market size L/tF leads to: (i) an increase in the intensity of competition λ; (ii) a decrease in the purchase of the ideal variety q 0 ; (iii) a price decrease (increase) whenever ε u (·) is a decreasing (increasing) function; (iv) each rm's output Q always changes opposite to price. (v) Expanding ratio L/F leads to a decrease in the service rangeθ (to more localized competition), and to increasing density of rms µ, in this case decreasing price guarantees increasing welfare. (vi) A decrease in the distance cost t leads to more (less) entry, i.e. increasing (decreasing) µwhenever ε u (·) is a decreasing (increasing) function.
Proof. We start again by noticing that elements of relative market size L/tF enters the free-entry condition only together (as this ratio) and we can focus on derivatives in L.
To study the intensity of competition λ, we totally dierentiate in L the free-entry condition and express the result in partial derivatives:
Π p dp dL
where Π p = 0 because of the prot maximization. Therefore,
so, the intensity of competition increases. Moreover,
To study q 0 , we again study the equilibrium through quantities, and make use of the fact that consumption of a variety produced by the closest rm is q 0 = D(λp), so that λp = u (q 0 ).
The zero prot and free-entry conditions become
Totally dierentiating them we obtain
Again, from the rst equation we see that price and quantity comove whenever the elasticity of utility is decreasing, but move opposite when the elasticity of utility is increasing. Combining the two equations we obtain:
reaction of the density of rms to the change in the disutility parameter, consider the consumer budget constraint in the following form:
From this it is evident that the density of rms comoves with the prices in response to the change in transport cost. Thus, whenever the elementary utility function has DEU property, a decrease in transport cost leads to an increase in the density of rms, and vice versa. Observe, that the analysis in the version of the model with the disutility of distance is unambiguous because there is now mechanical eect of saving labor on the cheaper transport.
Thus, we have shown that under partial coverage by service, both versions of the model exhibit similar comparative statics: the market is pro-competitive whenever the elasticity of utility is a decreasing function. Other variables also behave naturally: an increase in the market size (population density) intensies competition, leads to smaller consumption of each varieties and more localized competition. The intuition behind such result remains the same independently of the model version, i.e., the explanations given for the case of transport cost can be repeated for this section too.
Full-coverage equilibria under disutility of distance
Now we consider properties and comparative statics of equilibrium when service coverage is full. As in the version of the model with monetary distance cost, full coverage is substantially less tractable analytically. Again, the dierence from monetary cost, is λ disappearing from expression λtS. We again denote by q 0 = D(λp) the consumption of the ideal variety and by q 1 = D(λp + tS) the consumption of the least liked variety, produced at the opposite extreme of the circumference. The rm's gross output becomes Q =
Our reference point in the analysis will be the situation when a consumer buys from each and every rm because of suciently low transport cost t ≈ 0. Constructing any point as a departure from t ≈ 0, and using the Taylor series expansion we can express the consumer surplus from the least preferred variety as:
Substituting this expression back into the prot denition for the case of full coverage and using only the rst order approximation, we eectively obtain an approximation of the prot function:
In other words, under t ≈ 0 the model collapses to a case with no distance, studied in ZKPT. As ZKPT shows, in this case the behavior of the elasticity of marginal utility (rather than utility itself ) denes the direction of comparative statics eects with respect to market size. This observation sheds light on the model behavior in between the two extreme cases, i.e. when rms serve all consumers but the disutility from shopping far away is not suciently small. Now we turn to formal analysis of the comparative statics under full coverage. Dierentiating the free-entry condition
with respect to price, we obtain the rm's rst-order condition (using q 0 = D(λp), q 1 = D(λp + tS)):
used to derive the SOC 0 > d dp
We assume it to hold in equilibrium, which is guaranteed under u (q) ≥ 0.
Under constant cost F , we can express equilibrium conditions for (q 0 , q 1 , p, λ) as equations
The complexity of this model in the case of full coverage hampers the comparative statics, but at least we can formulate one more atness condition that may hold (or not) at the equilibrium. Namely, function ζ(q 0 , D(u (q 0 ) + tS)) introduced in (27) should be increasing in q 0 , this condition being reformulated as
This restriction is obviously satised for a linear demand (the left-hand side being positive, comparable with 0.5, whereas the right hand side is equal to zero) and, hopefully, for some other demands. Then, it is possible to guarantee the pro-competitive behavior of the market when demand is not too convex in this sense.
Proposition 7. Consider the version of the model with disutility of distance, full market coverage and xed F (µ) = F . Then, (i) an increase in relative market size L/tF leads to an increase in the intensity of competition λ.
(ii) Increasing ratio L/F implies decreasing consumption q 0 of the ideal variety, and whenever (29) holds, price p decreases (pro-competitive eect), while per-consumer output Q always changes opposite to price p.
Proof. As before, we analyze our comparative statics in market size through variable L, and results for parameter L/tF follow. One can write down the free-entry condition as:
Totally dierentiating it with respect to L we express the result in partial derivatives:
The rst term here is zero because of the prot maximization. Hence Further, to study consumption q 0 , the two equilibrium equations can become ζ(q 0 , D(u (q 0 )+ tS))p = (p − m) and
which, as a function of q 0 , becomes[
We know that total elasticity E λ/L < 1, so, the right-hand side decreases in L, and an increasing (in q 0 ) left-hand side here should be a necessary and sucient condition for decreasing equilibrium value of q 0 . Using tedious but straightforward algebra, one can show that the SOC guarantees the left-hand side is decreasing in q 0 . Thus, q 0 decreases in L.
Further, increasing function ζ(q 0 , D(u (q 0 ) + tS)) is a necessary and sucient condition for comovement of price p and quantity q 0 , because equation (27) has its right-hand side increasing in p. Taking the derivative
one, after some algebra, nds that positivity ζ > 0 is exactly the condition (27) assumed. So, our comovement is established, and decreasing q 0 entails decreasing p.
Finally, output Q = F/(p − m) always changes opposite to price. Q.E.D.
The sucient condition (27) for pro-competitive eect, exploited in Proposition 4includes linear demand and many other reasonable functional forms. We emphasize that it conrms general intuitive conclusion from the literature that at demands should generate pro-competitive market eects.
Welfare: excessive or insucient entry
One of the most prevalent questions in theory of product dierentiation, is whether the market equilibrium leads to insucient or excessive rms' entry. In this section, we provide an answer specic to our framework, through comparing market outcome with social optimum.
We focus on the second-best optimum: social planner can choose prices and the number of entrants, but rms should have non-negative prot. In other words, we don't allow for crosssubsidization and lump-sum transfers from consumers to rms. We focus on the second best because we nd it more relevant to real life regulation: we believe that direct transfers from consumers to rms are politically implausible. We proceed through the following (traditional)
steps: rst, we set up social planner problem, and show that it can be reduced to an unconstrained choice of one variable the consumption of an ideal variety. Second, we show that the market equilibrium can be represented analogously to social planner problem but with the objective function being aggregate revenue in the economy, rather than utility. Afterwards, we show how comparison of these two objective functions allows us to make conclusions about the relation between social optimum and equilibrium outcome, and nally, we relate this comparison back to the primitives of our model.
We focus on the partial coverage case for its analytical tractability and intuitive appeal. We rst analyze the disutility of distance version, but show later on that results carry over to the case of monetary cost of transport. We start with the social planner problem. Although our original assumption is that prots must be non-negative, it is easy to see that at social optimum prots must be zero. Otherwise, social planner could keep the number of varieties xed and decrease their prices, thereby generating additional utility without violating non-negative prot.
recall that from consumer's optimality it follows that u (q o (x)) = u (q q(p, µ, x)dx from above into the constraint problem, plugging µ from the labor balance constraint and using the consumer's choice optimality u (q e 0 ) = λp, we get the result.
To prove the rst part of the proposition, we characterize the solution of modied problem, and show that its rst-order condition coincides with market equilibrium conditions. For simpler exposition, we introduce the following notation: rm's cost as a function of consumption of ideal varietyC (q 
Proof. We start with the rst part of proposition. Consider the case ε U (q) < ε R (q). ε U (q) < ε R (q) ⇐⇒ −2q 2 u u −qu 2 +´q 0 u 2 dz < qu (u − 2qu ) u (u − qu )
